PPBS

Zeitgeist [2016]

A Politico-Psychological Analysis

Report generated

March 23, 2026

1 Study Characteristics

1.1 Items: Zeitgeist

1.2 Sample

N=1500

To conduct a exploratory and a confirmatory large surveys during the general election, we hired a professional survey firm (SSI, a US-based market research company that recruits participants from a panel of 7,139,027 American citizens; more information can be found at www.surveysampling.com (now https://www.dynata.com/) to recruit a nationally representative sample of 1,500 Americans (50.7% women) who completed study materials during the general election from August 16-September 9, 2016. (Information about sampling and exclusion criteria is included in the Supplement). The age distribution was as follows: 18-24 (12.9%), 25-34 (17.6%), 35-44 (17.5%), 45-54 (19.5%), 55-65 (15.6%) and older than 65 (16.9%). The ethnic breakdown was: White/European American (82.5%), Black/African American (7.7%), Latino (5.9%) and “Other” (4.0%). Concerning religion, 67.6% identified as Christian, 17.1% as religiously affiliated but not Christian, and 15.3% as Atheist/Agnostic. With respect to education 35.1% indicated “high school only or lower,” 31.4 % indicated “some college,” and 33.6% indicated having received a “Bachelor” or “Graduate” degree. 2424 participants were directed to the survey, 1885 of which finished the survey (attrition rate 22%).

We followed recommendations to minimize the problem of careless responding in online studies. Specifically, we employed 10 random attention questions and time controls to check for data quality. There were 385 participants who failed more than one attention check or finished the survey in under ~22 minutes and were therefore excluded from the sample. For the 1500 participants who successfully finished the survey, completion time was 67 minutes on average (MD: 51min).

2 Descriptives

2.1 Means, SD, Range, & SE

Table 1: Descriptives
Descriptives for Zeitgeist
mean sd median se
Collective_Discontent_mean 10.98 4.12 10.98 0.11
Personal_Discontent_mean 5.23 3.26 5.23 0.08
Note:
n = 1500, min = 0, max = 30
Table 2: Descriptives – Item Level
Descriptives for Zeitgeist at Item Level
n mean sd median se
Collective_Discontent1 466 11.78 10.39 9.00 0.48
Collective_Discontent2 466 9.48 9.53 6.00 0.44
Collective_Discontent3 466 9.71 9.26 6.00 0.43
Collective_Discontent4 466 12.14 9.94 10.00 0.46
Collective_Discontent5 466 7.88 9.24 4.00 0.43
Collective_Discontent6 466 15.14 10.26 15.00 0.48
Collective_Discontent7 466 13.34 9.84 12.00 0.46
Collective_Discontent8 466 11.21 9.63 9.00 0.45
Collective_Discontent9 466 8.09 8.86 5.00 0.41
Collective_Discontent10 466 10.28 9.55 8.00 0.44
Collective_Discontent11 466 11.69 9.51 10.00 0.44
Collective_Discontent12 466 14.23 10.65 14.00 0.49
Collective_Discontent13 466 9.73 9.69 7.00 0.45
Collective_Discontent14 466 11.15 10.10 8.00 0.47
Collective_Discontent15 466 8.81 9.38 5.00 0.43
Collective_Discontent16 466 10.44 9.78 8.00 0.45
Collective_Discontent17 466 8.00 9.18 4.00 0.43
Collective_Discontent18 466 11.95 10.26 10.00 0.48
Collective_Discontent19 466 10.42 9.85 8.00 0.46
Collective_Discontent20 466 11.88 9.94 10.00 0.46
Collective_Discontent21 466 9.38 9.21 6.00 0.43
Collective_Discontent22 466 9.47 9.55 7.00 0.44
Collective_Discontent23 466 10.05 9.70 8.00 0.45
Collective_Discontent24 466 12.23 10.44 10.00 0.48
Collective_Discontent25 466 9.25 9.78 5.00 0.45
Collective_Discontent26 466 14.40 10.89 14.00 0.50
Collective_Discontent27 466 12.61 10.74 10.00 0.50
Collective_Discontent28 466 11.39 9.74 10.00 0.45
Collective_Discontent29 466 12.31 10.15 10.00 0.47
Personal_Discontent1 464 4.11 7.68 0.50 0.36
Personal_Discontent2 464 4.13 7.70 0.00 0.36
Personal_Discontent3 464 4.32 7.58 0.00 0.35
Personal_Discontent4 464 5.10 7.89 1.00 0.37
Personal_Discontent5 464 4.47 7.86 1.00 0.36
Personal_Discontent6 464 8.72 10.43 4.00 0.48
Personal_Discontent7 464 7.03 10.06 1.00 0.47
Personal_Discontent8 464 4.14 7.24 1.00 0.34
Personal_Discontent9 464 3.17 6.39 0.00 0.30
Personal_Discontent10 464 4.72 7.84 1.00 0.36
Personal_Discontent11 464 5.22 9.19 0.00 0.43
Personal_Discontent12 464 8.30 10.69 2.00 0.50
Personal_Discontent13 464 4.30 7.85 0.00 0.36
Personal_Discontent14 464 5.42 8.89 1.00 0.41
Personal_Discontent15 464 4.41 8.09 0.00 0.38
Personal_Discontent16 464 5.27 8.97 0.00 0.42
Personal_Discontent17 464 4.61 8.35 0.00 0.39
Personal_Discontent18 464 5.76 9.08 1.00 0.42
Personal_Discontent19 464 4.19 7.96 0.00 0.37
Personal_Discontent20 464 3.75 7.51 0.00 0.35
Personal_Discontent21 464 3.75 6.95 0.00 0.32
Personal_Discontent22 464 3.65 7.14 0.00 0.33
Personal_Discontent23 464 4.65 8.14 0.00 0.38
Personal_Discontent24 464 6.29 9.32 1.00 0.43
Personal_Discontent25 464 3.72 7.39 0.00 0.34
Personal_Discontent26 464 8.52 10.97 2.00 0.51
Personal_Discontent27 464 8.41 10.92 2.00 0.51
Personal_Discontent28 464 5.46 8.76 1.00 0.41
Personal_Discontent29 464 6.09 9.18 1.00 0.43
Collective_Discontent_mean 466 10.98 7.39 10.03 0.34
Personal_Discontent_mean 464 5.23 5.87 2.66 0.27
Note:
All items: min = 0, max = 30. Collective_Discontent_mean: min = 0, max = 30. Personal_Discontent_mean: min = 0, max = 30

2.2 Response Distribution

Figure 1: Proportion of each facet of Zeitgeist at item level: Collective_Discontent
Figure 2: Proportion of each facet of Zeitgeist at item level: Personal_Discontent
Figure 3: Collective_Discontent
Figure 4: Personal_Discontent

2.3 Correlations

2.3.1 Correlation Plots

Figure 5: Bivariate Spearman correlations: Zeitgeist
Figure 6: Bivariate Spearman correlations: Collective_Discontent
Figure 7: Bivariate Spearman correlations: Personal_Discontent

Note. Upper triangle shows Spearman’s rank-order correlations. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.

2.3.2 PIDF

Note. Upper triangle shows Spearman’s rank-order correlations by party identity. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.

2.3.3 Correlation Matrix

3 Demographics

3.1 Social Class

Figure 8: Collective_Discontent
Figure 9: Personal_Discontent
Figure 10: Collective_Discontent
Figure 11: Personal_Discontent

Note on the Raincloud Plots

  • Statistical summary (top): Welch’s t-test (or ANOVA) results, effect size, confidence intervals, p-values, and sample sizes are shown above each plot.
  • Bayesian analysis (bottom): Log Bayes factor and credible intervals are reported below each plot.
Table 3
Table 4: Personal_Discontent as grouped by SES
(a)
SES N Mean SD
Poor 38 0.11 1.35
Lower Middle Class 298 0.06 1.06
Middle Middle Class 679 0.05 1.05
Upper Middle Class 395 -0.07 0.85
Rich 90 -0.28 0.82
(b)
SES N Mean SD
Poor 38 -0.15 0.69
Lower Middle Class 298 0.06 1.09
Middle Middle Class 679 0.04 1.08
Upper Middle Class 395 -0.05 0.87
Rich 90 -0.23 0.64

3.2 Gender

Figure 12: Zeitgeist Facets, as grouped by Gender: Collective_Discontent
Figure 13: Zeitgeist Facets, as grouped by Gender: Personal_Discontent
Figure 14: Collective_Discontent
Figure 15: Personal_Discontent
Table 5
Table 6: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Gender
(a)
Gender N Mean SD
Female 760 0.04 0.83
Male 740 -0.04 1.14
(b)
Gender N Mean SD
Female 760 -0.02 0.71
Male 740 0.02 1.23

3.3 Age

Figure 16: Collective_Discontent
Figure 17: Personal_Discontent
Figure 18: Collective_Discontent
Figure 19: Personal_Discontent
Table 7
Table 8: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Age
(a)
Age N Mean SD
18-24 years 193 0.05 1.28
25-34 years 264 0.11 1.09
35-44 years 263 0.04 0.90
45-54 years 292 -0.03 0.54
55-64 years 234 0.01 0.21
65+ 254 -0.17 1.48
(b)
Age N Mean SD
18-24 years 193 0.25 1.57
25-34 years 264 0.06 0.97
35-44 years 263 -0.12 0.65
45-54 years 292 -0.01 0.54
55-64 years 234 -0.02 0.18
65+ 254 -0.09 1.48

3.4 Education

Figure 20: Collective_Discontent
Figure 21: Personal_Discontent
Figure 22: Collective_Discontent
Figure 23: Personal_Discontent
Table 9
Table 10: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Education
(a)
Education N Mean SD
Less than High School 51 0.02 1.01
High School 475 0.09 1.24
Some College 471 0.02 0.93
Bachelor 310 -0.05 0.77
Graduate 193 -0.18 0.76
(b)
Education N Mean SD
Less than High School 51 -0.09 1.18
High School 475 0.10 1.30
Some College 471 -0.02 0.84
Bachelor 310 -0.02 0.82
Graduate 193 -0.14 0.64

3.5 Income Levels

Figure 24: Collective_Discontent
Figure 25: Personal_Discontent
Figure 26: Collective_Discontent
Figure 27: Personal_Discontent
Table 11
Table 12: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Income Levels
(a)
Income Levels N Mean SD
Less than $15,000 178 0.09 1.19
$15,000-$24,999 180 -0.05 1.12
$25,000-$34,999 176 0.03 1.16
$35,000-$49,999 227 0.08 0.91
$50,000-$74,999 292 0.02 0.91
$75,000-$99,999 192 -0.02 0.70
$100,000-$149,999 160 -0.06 1.00
$150,000 + 95 -0.26 0.99
(b)
Income Levels N Mean SD
Less than $15,000 178 0.10 1.16
$15,000-$24,999 180 -0.01 1.09
$25,000-$34,999 176 0.06 1.17
$35,000-$49,999 227 0.03 1.05
$50,000-$74,999 292 0.01 0.83
$75,000-$99,999 192 -0.03 0.67
$100,000-$149,999 160 -0.06 1.02
$150,000 + 95 -0.18 1.04

3.6 Ethnicity

Figure 28: Collective_Discontent
Figure 29: Personal_Discontent

Note on the Okabe-Ito color palette. The Okabe-Ito color palette (seen above) is a set of colorblind-friendly categorical colors available in R. We are using this palette for graphs with non-ordered variables (e.g., groups, categories) for accessibility.

Figure 30: Collective_Discontent
Figure 31: Personal_Discontent
Table 13
Table 14: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Ethnicity
(a)
Ethnicity N Mean SD
Caucasian/European origin 1237 -0.02 1.01
Black/African American 115 0.12 0.90
Latino 88 0.14 1.01
Asian/Pacific Islander 29 -0.13 0.59
Native American 13 0.08 0.94
Other 18 0.28 1.15
(b)
Ethnicity N Mean SD
Caucasian/European origin 1237 -0.01 1.01
Black/African American 115 0.01 0.79
Latino 88 0.16 1.16
Asian/Pacific Islander 29 -0.11 0.74
Native American 13 0.21 0.95
Other 18 0.11 0.94

3.7 Occupation

Figure 32: Collective_Discontent
Figure 33: Personal_Discontent
Figure 34: Collective_Discontent
Figure 35: Personal_Discontent
Table 15
Table 16: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Occupation
(a)
Occupation N Mean SD
Employed 768 0.01 0.83
Retired 268 -0.15 1.31
Unemployed 146 0.04 1.22
Parent 104 0.09 0.95
Disabled 98 0.11 0.88
Student 85 0.01 1.10
Full-time caregiver 31 0.13 0.80
(b)
Occupation N Mean SD
Employed 768 0.01 0.85
Retired 268 -0.08 1.32
Unemployed 146 0.07 1.08
Parent 104 -0.04 0.89
Disabled 98 -0.03 0.60
Student 85 0.13 1.45
Full-time caregiver 31 0.08 0.70

3.8 Area

Figure 36: Collective_Discontent
Figure 37: Personal_Discontent
Figure 38: Collective_Discontent
Figure 39: Personal_Discontent
Table 17
Table 18: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Area
(a)
Area N Mean SD
Urban 955 -0.02 0.98
Rural 545 0.03 1.03
(b)
Area N Mean SD
Urban 955 -0.02 0.95
Rural 545 0.03 1.09

3.9 Religious Affiliation

Figure 40: Collective_Discontent
Figure 41: Personal_Discontent
Figure 42: Collective_Discontent
Figure 43: Personal_Discontent
Table 19
Table 20: Personal_Discontent as grouped by Religious Affiliation
(a)
Religious Affiliation N Mean SD
Christian 1014 0.03 1.01
Muslim 9 -0.36 0.88
Jewish 52 -0.14 0.94
Atheist/Agnostic 230 -0.06 0.98
Not listed, No religion 195 -0.02 0.97
(b)
Religious Affiliation N Mean SD
Christian 1014 0.00 1.00
Muslim 9 -0.29 0.71
Jewish 52 -0.11 0.74
Atheist/Agnostic 230 0.09 1.09
Not listed, No religion 195 -0.04 0.94

3.10 Section Summary

  Zeitgeist
Predictors Estimates CI p
(Intercept) 10.67 8.22 – 13.13 <.001
Age -0.22 -0.51 – 0.07 .144
Income -0.05 -0.34 – 0.25 .753
Education -0.56 -1.15 – 0.03 .064
Gender (Male) 0.01 -1.22 – 1.25 .984
Observations 466
R2 / R2 adjusted .026 / .018

4 Political Behavior

4.1 Political Orientation

Correlation with General Conservatism, Economic Conservatism, Social Conservatism

Figure 44: Collective_Discontent
Figure 45: Personal_Discontent
Figure 46: Collective_Discontent
Figure 47: Personal_Discontent
Figure 48: Collective_Discontent
Figure 49: Personal_Discontent

Note. The y-axis shows residuals after regressing the outcome on demographics (Age, Income, Education, Gender). This illustrates how much the focal construct explains beyond demographic factors.

Table 21: Zeitgeist and Political Orientation
Table 22: Zeitgeist models and Demographics

4.2 Partisanship

Figure 50: Collective_Discontent
Figure 51: Personal_Discontent
Table 23: Mean Collective_Discontent by Party Identity (raw means)
Party Identity N Mean SD
Strong Democrat 351 11.20 2.99
Democrat 223 11.01 3.68
Leaning Democrat 124 10.47 4.00
Independent 84 10.33 4.50
Leaning Republican 111 11.27 4.64
Republican 255 10.84 4.27
Strong Republican 318 11.04 4.97
Table 24: Mean Personal_Discontent by Party Identity (raw means)
Party Identity N Mean SD
Strong Democrat 351 5.24 1.95
Democrat 223 5.05 2.57
Leaning Democrat 124 5.09 3.00
Independent 84 5.10 3.49
Leaning Republican 111 5.46 3.83
Republican 255 5.37 3.93
Strong Republican 318 5.22 3.82
Table 25: Zeitgeist & Party Identity (7-point)
Table 26: Zeitgeist & Party Identity with Controls

4.3 Religiosity

Figure 52: Collective_Discontent
Figure 53: Personal_Discontent
Figure 54: Collective_Discontent
Figure 55: Personal_Discontent

Note. The y-axis shows residuals after regressing the outcome on demographics (Age, Income, Education, Gender). This illustrates how much the focal construct explains beyond demographic factors.

Figure 56: Collective_Discontent
Figure 57: Personal_Discontent

4.4 Candidate Preferences

Figure 58: Collective_Discontent
Figure 59: Personal_Discontent
Table 27: Candidate Preference and Collective_Discontent [centered]
Candidate Preference N Mean SD
Donald Trump 444 0.06 1.14
Hillary Clinton 371 -0.06 0.84
Bernie Sanders 362 0.08 0.96
Ted Cruz 122 -0.05 1.04
Jeb Bush 83 -0.17 0.83
Gary Johnson 68 -0.13 1.16
Rand Paul 44 -0.02 0.88
Table 28: Candidate Preference and Personal_Discontent [centered]
Candidate Preference N Mean SD
Donald Trump 444 0.11 1.27
Hillary Clinton 371 -0.10 0.71
Bernie Sanders 362 0.05 0.93
Ted Cruz 122 -0.11 0.89
Jeb Bush 83 -0.12 0.89
Gary Johnson 68 -0.10 0.98
Rand Paul 44 -0.04 0.87
Table 29: Candidate Preference and Collective_Discontent [raw means]
Candidate Preference N Mean SD
Donald Trump 444 11.24 4.68
Hillary Clinton 371 10.72 3.47
Bernie Sanders 362 11.31 3.97
Ted Cruz 122 10.76 4.27
Jeb Bush 83 10.28 3.42
Gary Johnson 68 10.43 4.77
Rand Paul 44 10.90 3.64
Table 30: Candidate Preference and Personal_Discontent [raw means]
Candidate Preference N Mean SD
Donald Trump 444 5.59 4.16
Hillary Clinton 371 4.92 2.32
Bernie Sanders 362 5.39 3.05
Ted Cruz 122 4.86 2.89
Jeb Bush 83 4.84 2.89
Gary Johnson 68 4.90 3.19
Rand Paul 44 5.11 2.84

4.5 Party Preferences

Figure 60: Collective_Discontent
Figure 61: Personal_Discontent
Table 31: Party Preference and Collective_Discontent [centered]
Party Preference N Mean SD
Democratic Party 560 0.00 0.80
Republican Party 508 0.01 1.12
Libertarian Party 100 -0.10 1.07
Green Party 40 0.16 0.84
Tea Party 68 0.00 1.10
Constitution Party 14 -0.20 0.53
None 120 -0.02 1.19
Don't know 90 0.04 1.08
Table 32: Party Preference and Personal_Discontent [centered]
Party Preference N Mean SD
Democratic Party 560 -0.01 0.72
Republican Party 508 0.00 1.15
Libertarian Party 100 -0.05 1.15
Green Party 40 0.06 0.77
Tea Party 68 0.14 1.14
Constitution Party 14 -0.19 0.49
None 120 0.10 1.32
Don't know 90 -0.15 0.96
Table 33: Party Preference and Collective_Discontent [raw means]
Party Preference N Mean SD
Democratic Party 560 10.97 3.28
Republican Party 508 11.04 4.63
Libertarian Party 100 10.57 4.42
Green Party 40 11.65 3.46
Tea Party 68 10.96 4.53
Constitution Party 14 10.15 2.19
None 120 10.89 4.91
Don't know 90 11.15 4.45
Table 34: Party Preference and Personal_Discontent [raw means]
Party Preference N Mean SD
Democratic Party 560 5.21 2.35
Republican Party 508 5.23 3.76
Libertarian Party 100 5.08 3.75
Green Party 40 5.44 2.53
Tea Party 68 5.69 3.72
Constitution Party 14 4.61 1.59
None 120 5.56 4.30
Don't know 90 4.73 3.12

4.6 Voting

Table 35
Figure 62: Collective Discontent
Figure 63: Personal Discontent

4.7 Voting & Party Identity

Figure 64: Collective_Discontent
Figure 65: Personal_Discontent
Table 36: Collective_Discontent and Party Identity
Donald Trump Hilary Clinton
Strong Republican 282 7
Republican 166 24
Leaning Republican 58 7
Independent 17 16
Leaning Democrat 10 65
Democrat 27 129
Strong Democrat 4 323
Table 37: Personal_Discontent and Party Identity
Donald Trump Hilary Clinton
Strong Republican 282 7
Republican 166 24
Leaning Republican 58 7
Independent 17 16
Leaning Democrat 10 65
Democrat 27 129
Strong Democrat 4 323
Table 38
Figure 66: Collective_Discontent
Figure 67: Personal_Discontent

4.8 Likeability

Figure 68: Collective_Discontent
Figure 69: Personal_Discontent
Figure 70: Collective_Discontent
Figure 71: Personal_Discontent

Note. The y-axis shows residuals after regressing the outcome on demographics (Age, Income, Education, Gender). This illustrates how much the focal construct explains beyond demographic factors.

Figure 72: Collective_Discontent
Figure 73: Personal_Discontent
Figure 74: Collective_Discontent
Figure 75: Personal_Discontent

Note. The y-axis shows residuals after regressing the outcome on demographics (Age, Income, Education, Gender). This illustrates how much the focal construct explains beyond demographic factors.

Figure 76: Collective_Discontent
Figure 77: Personal_Discontent
Figure 78: Collective_Discontent
Figure 79: Personal_Discontent

Note. The y-axis shows residuals after regressing the outcome on demographics (Age, Income, Education, Gender). This illustrates how much the focal construct explains beyond demographic factors.

5 Politico-Psychological correlates of Zeitgeist


5.1 Ideologies and Partisanship

Figure 80: Collective_Discontent
Figure 81: Personal_Discontent

5.2 Populism, Nationalism, Nativism, and Patriotism

Figure 82: Collective_Discontent
Figure 83: Personal_Discontent



5.3 Political Psychology

Figure 84: Collective_Discontent
Figure 85: Personal_Discontent

5.4 Social Justice Concerns, Empathy, and Prejudice

Figure 86: Collective_Discontent
Figure 87: Personal_Discontent



5.5 Values

Figure 88: Collective_Discontent
Figure 89: Personal_Discontent



5.6 Pot-Pourri

Figure 90: Collective_Discontent
Figure 91: Personal_Discontent



5.7 Positive and Negative correlates of Zeitgeist

Figure 92: Collective_Discontent
Figure 93: Personal_Discontent
Figure 94: Collective_Discontent
Figure 95: Personal_Discontent

6 Elastic Net Analysis

Figure 96: Elastic net predicting Zeitgeist: Political Psychology
Figure 97: Elastic net predicting Zeitgeist: Ideology & Partisanship
Figure 98: Elastic net predicting Zeitgeist: Demographics
Figure 99: Elastic net predicting Zeitgeist: Attitudes
Figure 100: Elastic net predicting Zeitgeist: Everything
Table 39: Elastic Net Summary
Elastic Net R² for predicting Zeitgeist
Variable Group # Predictors R²
Political Psychology 5 .099
Ideology & Partisanship 5 .000
Demographics 5 .020
Attitudes 6 .111
Everything 21 .150
PPBS
Psychology of Political Behavior Studies PI: Flavio Azevedo